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Preliminary Remarks 
 
ottlob Frege may be considered as the first intellectual giant in the 
Philosophy of Language.  He was the first to raise the issue of 
meaning by formulating an organized theory of meaning for a part of 
natural language as the theory of meaning is at the core of philosophy of 
language.  He emphasizes that the meaning of a sentence directly depends on 
the meaning of its constituent parts.  That is why he has to dissect the internal 
structure of a sentence or complex expressions provided by a logical syntax, 
while the truth value of such sentences may be revealed by logical semantics 
which can be put forward by treating these sentences as a whole.   
Hence, in order to move into the Frege’s theory of meaning deeply, 
the treatment of sentences will have to be taken both semantically and 
syntactically, as he did not propose a sharp distinction between syntactic and 
semantic treatment of sentences.  He is concerned about determining truth 
value of sentences which in turn is to be decided by the latter.  Jefffrey C. King 
and UC Davis point this issue out: 
 
A primary purpose of semantics for a natural language is 
to compositionally assign to sentences semantic values 
that determine whether the sentences are true or false.  
Since natural language contain contextually sensitive 
expressions, semantic values must be assigned to 
sentences relative to contexts.  These semantic values are 
propositions .  .  ..   Propositions are the primary bearer of 
truth and falsity.1 
 
It is in this context that the theory of meaning can be called as 
organized.  For the first time sentences of a considerable part of language may 
be treated as true or false and hence logic came into existence.  The logic could 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey C. King and UC Davis, “Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values, ” in 
Philosophical Perspectives , 17, Language and Philosophical Linguistics, ed. by John Hawthorne & Dean 
Zimmerman (2003). 
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not only provide the rules of inference but could also demonstrate their validity 
by deriving true conclusions from true premises.   
The theory of meaning fundamentally contains two ingredients, i.e., 
theory of sense and reference, and the other is the theory of force.  The latter 
may be described in Michael Dummett’s words: 
 
.  .  .  to the sense of a sentence belongs only that which is 
relevant to determining its truth or falsity; any feature of 
meaning which cannot affect its truth or falsity belongs to 
its tone.  Likewise, to the sense of an expression belongs 
only that which may be relevant to the truth or falsity of a 
sentence in which it might occur; any element of its 
meaning not so relevant is part of its tone.2 
 
Dummett talks about such feature of meaning that is not going to 
affect the semantic value of a sentence.  For instance, in any sentence of a 
fragment of natural language, if we substitute a word, say, ‘for’ in place of ‘and’, 
then the meaning of that sentence will distort but this substitution is not going 
to alter the truth value of that sentence, it was this kind of feature of meaning 
which Dummett talks about.  Wang Lu pointed out that: 
 
It is clear that this framework is based on some of Frege’s 
concepts.  Dummett took the theory of reference and 
sense as the principal of the theory of meaning, which is 
exactly the primary content of Frege’s philosophy of 
language.  That he regarded the theory of reference as the 
central concept directly coincides with Frege’s 
formulation.  Dummett takes Frege’s entire formulation 
of reference to constitute the core of the theory of 
meaning.  Hence, the theory of meaning should inherit 
Frege’s results of reference and take them as the basis of 
discussion and development.  To this extent, the central 
core of the theory of meaning clearly correlates with 
reality and truth, because the core of Frege’s theory of 
meaning is the notion of truth.3 
 
Wang Lu portrays the picture of the theory of meaning which put 
fundamental emphasis on the theory of reference and which is conceptually 
directed towards the concept of truth.  The proper name is one of the most 
striking feature of the theory of meaning which is roughly based on the notion 
                                                 
2 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, second edition (London: Duckworth, 
1981), 2. 
3 Wang Lu, “Theories of Meaning,” in Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 3: 1 (2008), 2.  
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of reference ( as we will see later), reference being the meaning of proper 
name.  Mark Platt observed that ‘The meaning of a proper name is its bearer.’4 
Hence, our discussion will confined to the theory of sense and 
reference which also consists of two ingredients inseparably connected to each 
other, i.e.,the theory of sense and the theory of reference.  The former is 
concerned with the issue of meaning while the later is the principle on which 
former rests (which in turn is cohesively tied to the notion of proper names).   
The essence of Frege’s philosophy of language lies on the fact that he 
was actually concerned about formulating a theory of meaning which is 
inseparably connected to the theories of sense and reference.  Dummett 
possesses a uniform approach regarding Frege’s theory of meaning and it 
seems that, in most of the part of his work, he had been successful in 
displaying this approach of Frege.   
As we will later observe, Dummett contributes much in explaining the 
theory of meaning of Frege (however, he was not always successful in his 
attempts to do so) and at the same time reflecting his own ideas on the subject. 
Apart from the theory of meaning of Frege, his earlier works 
Begriffschrift and Grundlagen  was dedicated to invent a symbolic language in 
which any mathematical propositions can be framed to bring about the 
presentation of proof which such mathematical assertions provide.  By 
describing the structure of sentences his objective was to justify the truth 
values assigned to them and the ways by which rules of inference used to 
understand these sentences may also be justified.  Dummett claims that: 
 
The analysis of language which Frege undertook involved 
on analysis of the working of language.  Frege didn’t 
content himself with finding a characterization of the 
totality of sentences of the symbolic language nor with a 
mere stipulation of the rules of inference he thought it 
adequate to employ.  Rather the description of the 
structure of sentences of this language was accompanied 
by an account of the way in which their truth values were 
determined and the rules of inference laid down were 
then seen to be justified by the rules governing 
assignment of truth values.5 
 
Frege could recognize the two intimately related semantic properties in 
the theory of meaning, i.e., Meaning (Bedeutung) and Sense (Sinn).  He found 
that this new discovery didn’t contradict to his earlier works rather it made his 
theory even more plausible and clear.  He could visualize what sort of analysis 
he worked with.   
                                                 
4 See also Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning An introduction to a Philosophy of Language 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 134. 
5 Dummett, op cit., 81.  
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The theory of meaning which Frege proposes, an analysis provided by 
such theories, which stands for particular atomic sentence such as “Peter is 
wise.”  A sort of system had been provided in which the truth value of the 
atomic sentence may be determined which seems to be the ultimate objective 
of the theory of meaning suggested by Frege. 
The singular expression6 ‘Peter’ serves the functioning of introducing 
an object, which is in turn, is a matter of function to be augmented.  The 
function is in turn introduced by the concept expression ‘ξ is wise’, which is 
formed by omitting a proper name, i.e., ‘Peter.’  Putting any proper name in 
place of ‘ξ’, satisfying the corresponding object, i.e., wise object, the concept 
expression will yield an atomic sentence, which is determined with the 
possession of truth value (in terms of possessing significance of a complete 
sentence).And this function presents only such object, i.e., wise object on to 
the truth value as true. 
On the one hand a proper name may fail to correspond an object and 
hence devoid of meaning and also fail to present an atomic sentence in which it 
lies with an argument to the function stipulated with concept expression.  Any 
such atomic sentence will be devoid of any truth value.  Frege authorize it by 
stating that the sentence is neither true nor false.  It simply shows that the 
sentence falls short of having any truth value at all.  Dummett suggested 
elsewhere that Frege was thinking of a third value which is a member of the 
undesignated value class. 
If Frege would have recognized such third value, then his concepts 
would have treated objects as per broader category of entities, in this case too a 
sentence would have devoid of any truth value, as there is no argument 
displayed to the function that is appropriate.7 
Secondly, a concept expression may fall short of introducing a 
function which makes objects truth value.  In case, a partiality is found in the 
function of concept expression, and then is simply devoid of any meaning 
because such expressions can’t be used in general language to make some 
significant assertions regarding the facts. 
And if such expressions are allowed then naturally some atomic 
sentences would display the absence of truth value, particularly universally 
quantified sentences.  Frege, regarding empty singular terms concerning their 
meaning, points out in his unpublished work ‘Seventeen Key Sentences on 
Logic’: 
 
A sentence can be true or untrue only if it is an 
expression for a thought.  The sentence ‘Leo Sachse is a 
man’ is the expression of a thought only if ‘Leo Sachse’ 
designates something.  And so too the sentence ‘ this 
table is round’ is the expression of a thought only if the 
                                                 
6 Frege calls all singular expressions generally as proper names.  See also Dummett , op 
cit., 54. 
7 See also Gareth Evans, The Varieties of References, ed. by John McDowell (New York, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1982), 11.  
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words ‘this table’ are not empty sounds but designate 
something specific for me.8 
 
In  Grundlagen, Frege expresses a point of singular terms or proper 
names) which seems to be closer to the conception of Russell, i.e., the 
significance of singular terms depend upon its possessing a referent.  Any 
atomic sentence containing empty singular term can’t be uttered by someone a 
sentence would fail to express a thought.  Frege maintains that “The sentence 
“Leo Sachse is a man” is the expression of a thought only if “Leo Sachse” 
designates something.”9 
It is plausibly clear that any proper name like “Leo Sachse” has got 
significance in any sentence of thought expression if and only if, it designates 
something as a concrete object, in the absence of later, being an empty proper 
name, the proper name would fail to express a thought.  And therefore the 
sentence in which it occurs would not express any truth value.10  While, in ‘The 
thought’ Frege further asserts that: 
 
But if my intention is not realized, if I only think I see 
without really seeing, if on that account the designation 
‘that lime tree’ is empty , then I have gone astray into the 
sphere of fiction without knowing it or wanting to.11 
 
But it seems a matter of great surprise that Frege contradicts his own 
previous work regarding the stipulation of a proper name with its reference.  In 
above quote, Frege tries to deal with that part of natural language which we 
may call ‘fiction.’  Now, his position seems to be quite unjustifiable here as he 
tries to put emphasis on fiction to ascribe sense to empty proper names.   
It is worthwhile to present a separate account for the theory of sense 
and theory of reference concerning proper names (the theories taken 
separately, in fact, is an integrated approach of the theory of meaning, as per 
the views of Dummett) in order to reveal the significance of each theory in 
isolation from the another and the effect of their synthesis in the theory of 
meaning.   
The main aim of this article is to show the notion of proper names in 
the theory of meaning of Frege by acquiring the methodology of exploring the 
theory of sense and the theory of reference.  Taken separately and a synthesis 
of both the theories (in the light of proper names) presents Frege’s theory of 
meaning in a more comprehensive and plausible manner. 
                                                 
8  Frege, Posthumous Writings, 174. 
9  Ibid., 175. 
10 I am not thinking of any third undesignated value as Dummett did.  I mean the 
truth value of that sentence would simply be beyond truth, i.e., it will be neither truth nor false 
and it would be simply meaningless 
11 See “The thought,” in P.F. Strawson ed., Philosophical Logic, trans. by A.M. and 
Marcelle Quinton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 28.  
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The article briefly argues that the theory of speech acts (including the 
approach of J.L.  Austin and John R.  Searle) presents an evolutionary 
approach (of meaning, in the process of communication) over Frege’s theory 
of meaning. 
 
Theory of Sense Concerning Proper Names 
 
A preliminary remark to the concept of sense may be traced from the 
letter written by Frege to Philip Jourdain in 1914: 
 
Let us suppose an explorer traveling in an unexplored 
country sees a high snow capped mountain on the 
northern horizon.  By making inquiries among the natives 
he learns that its name is ‘Aphla.’By sighting it from 
different points he determines its position as exactly as 
possible, enter it in a map, and writes in his diary: ‘Aphla’ 
is at least 5000 meters high.’  Another explorer sees a 
snow capped mountain on the southern horizon and 
learns that it is called ‘Ateb.’He enters it in his map under 
his name.  Later comparison shows that both explorers 
saw the same mountain.  Now the content of the 
proposition ‘Ateb’ is Aphla’ is far from being mere 
consequences of the principle of identity, but contains a 
valuable piece of geographical knowledge.  What is stated 
in the proposition ‘Ateb is Aphla’ is certainly not the 
same thing as the content of the proposition ‘Ateb is 
Ateb.’  Now if what corresponds to the name ‘Aphla’ as 
part of the thought was the meaning of the name and 
hence mountain itself, then this would be the same in 
both thoughts.  The thought expressed in the proposition 
‘Ateb’ is ‘Aphla’ would have to coincide with the one in 
‘Ateb’ is ‘Ateb’, which is far from being the case.  What 
corresponds to the name ‘Ateb’ as part of the thought 
must therefore be different from what corresponds to the 
name ‘Aphla’ as part of the thought.  This can not 
therefore be the meaning which is same for both names, 
but must be something which is different in the two 
cases, and I say accordingly that the sense of the name 
‘Ateb’ is different from the sense of the name ‘Aphla.’12 
 
Frege describes sense as a mode of presentation.  He seems to focus on 
stipulating the path from proper name to its referent.  In present metaphor 
used by Frege, ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ are the two ordinary proper names used by 
the two travelers.  Later geographical discovery will demonstrate that it was 
                                                 
12 Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, 80.  
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one and the same mountain encountered from two different sides by the two 
travelers.  Hence, these proper names and thus propositions containing them 
express different senses but same referent, but before the geographical discovery.  
After the discovery of the names having same referent, these names will 
possess same sense also.  Now, the names are identity terms, i.e., by 
substituting one term for another in any proposition, is not going to alter its 
truth value (Lewis principle of identity).Hence, these names no more display 
different senses but their senses will also be the same as every competent 
speaker of language is expected to encounter these names in the same way and 
thus attaching the same sense to these two names.  Gareth Evans holds: 
 
Frege’s idea was that it may be a property of a singular 
term as an element of a public language that in order to 
understand utterances containing it, one must not only 
think of a particular object, its meaning but on think of 
that object in a particular way, i.e., every competent user of 
the language who understands the utterances will think of 
the object in the same way.13 
 
The theory of sense must provide understanding of the content 
present in the sentence, i.e., the subject matter of sentence.  John McDowell 
holds similar view, “. . . a theory of sense must fix the content of the saying 
which on intentional utterance of the sentence could be understood to be.”14  
In the metaphor provided by Frege, sentence such as ‘Aphla is over 
5000 meters high’ containing singular expressions/ordinary proper names 
‘Aphla’ has got truth value if and only if the mountain is over 5000 meters 
high.  There must be some justification of the correspondence between 
singular expressions and description attached to it.  In other words, the sense 
of these two proper names should be same (once the discovery that two proper 
names are referring the same referent, i.e., same mountains, has been made), if 
this is not the case, then the meaning of sentences used in expressing a thought 
about that mountain will be affected and as a result of which truth value of 
these sentences and hence their semantics will automatically be distorted, which 
is essentially against the objective of the theory of meaning. 
But it is not plausible to think that everybody has to think over 
sentence containing any particular expression in some particular way, i.e., 
particular sense must be attached to a particular proper name.For instance, it is 
not possible that everyone is able to determine the height of the mountain 
(‘Aphla’ or ‘Ateb’) as over 5000 meters high, by themselves (therefore they are 
not quite sure about the height of the mountain).They may only believe in the 
                                                 
13 Evans, op cit., 16. 
14 John McDowell, “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,” in Reference, truth 
and reality (essay on the philosophy of language), ed. by Mark Platts (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980), 142. 
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testimony of others regarding the same.  That’s why; they will ascribe different 
senses to either of two proper names15. 
Here, the definite descriptions attached to both proper names, i.e., .’  .  
.  is at least 5000 meters high’ is subject to empirical investigation and therefore 
doesn’t reflect truth necessarily16 (both travelers might have used wrong or not 
the right method to determine the height of the mountain or earth crust might 
have been shifted downward because of high gravitational pull or by some 
other remote cause).  ‘Aphla’ may be differentiated from ‘Ateb’ in being 
discovered from northern horizon while later may be differentiated from the 
former in being discovered by another traveler from southern region.  Hence, 
the physical part (I mean the kind of surface, the steepness involved in slope 
etc.) of ‘Aphla’ observed by one traveler from northern region will obviously 
be different from that of ‘Ateb’ which had been discovered by another traveler 
from southern region.  Therefore, two proper names, i.e., ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ 
would consist of different senses in spite of having the same referent.  Here, it 
would be what Frege calls different ways of presentation of the same referent (the 
mountain) which makes the senses of these two names different.   
Let us make this point more comprehensible.  In order to understand 
the sense of an expression determined by the object to which it corresponds; 
one must not only understand this specific object and its meaning but also its 
mode of presentation, as just has been discussed.   
In case a way is provided to the thinker over the subject actually a 
sense is provided to him.  To Frege, a mode of presentation had been provided to 
the thinker and he attaches sense to it, i.e., ‘Aphla.’  But what should be the 
mode of presentation? How can it be provided to the thinker? Is there any method 
of providing a mode of presentation to the thinker? Perhaps, Frege is silent on 
these questions. 
Frege utters ‘The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who 
is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it 
belongs’17.  He, in fact, invents the concept of sense to all those expressions 
which leads to some meaning.  In the metaphor used by the Frege, we may say 
that if somebody understands utterances of the sentence ‘Aphla is over 5000 
meters high’, he must think of it in some particular way.   
Dummett maintains that ‘In order to understand the sense ascribed to 
a proper name, one has to think of an object that immediately corresponds to 
it in a particular way.’18  The essence of the notion of sense lies in a certain 
expression occurring in a sentence.  The sense of this expression plays a pivotal 
role in its meaning which corresponds to the specification of the truth value of 
the sentence in which such expression lies.  Sense is one of the most important 
ingredients in revealing the meaning of an expression.  Dummett says: 
                                                 
15 Whenever I use the word ‘proper name,’ I mean ordinary proper name (not ‘logical 
proper name’ as Bertrand Russell holds). 
16 Here I am not providing model argument as Kripke did in his seminal lectures 
Naming and Necessity.   
17 Frege, Translations, 57. 
18 Dummett, op cit., 17.  
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.  .  .  this characterization of the notion of sense serves, 
indeed, to distinguish sense from other ingredients in 
meaning; but, for the rest, it is, in itself, purely 
programmatic.  We can get no grasp on the sort of thing 
which Frege took the sense of a word or expression to 
consist in without scrutinizing the distinction which he 
drew between sense and reference.19 
 
We may take another classical example used by Frege- ‘Morning Star’ 
and ‘Evening Star.’  These two proper names, too possess different senses, in 
spite of the fact that both refer to the same referent, i.e., planet ‘Venus.’   
Viewed in the morning, shining planet ‘Venus’ is called ‘Morning Star’ while in 
the evening the same referent is known as ‘Evening Star.’  The senses 
expressed by these two proper names in a sentence used in expressing a 
thought, is different however both consist of only one referent.  The names 
consist of what Dummett calls different cognitive value20( ‘informative content’) 
which directly provides linkage to the Frege’s notion of sense, hence both 
displays different senses as per their act of cognition (when observed in the 
morning- the planet ‘Venus’ is called ‘Morning Star’, the same referent when 
observed in the evening, is known as ‘Evening Star’).  Now, these two identity 
terms after discovery of being possessed the same referent, should lead 
towards having the same sense also because any competent speaker of language 
is aware of the fact that both terms (proper names) lead towards the same 
referent, i.e., planet ‘Venus.’  In this way, two routes21 are determined by the two 
terms which moves towards the same referent.  Here Frege seems to be 
concerned about to provide a way towards stipulation of reference through the 
notion of sense; this idea is later defended by Saul Kripke in his seminal 
lectures ‘Naming and Necessity.’  Mark Platts observes that: 
 
The route to the reference, according Frege and, on 
occasion, Dummett, will be some descriptive specification 
of the object: an object satisfying that description will be 
object named.  This descriptive content, the sense of the 
name, will be at least part of its meaning; will be 
understood, or known, by any speaker with mastery of 
the name concerned.22 
 
But how can we stipulate a reference indicated by a proper name or 
how can we propose criteria of identification of reference in all instances in 
which utterances of competent speaker of language remains the same.  In the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 89. 
20 Dummett, op cit., 104. 
21 The word is used by Dummett to show the Frege’s notion of sense in serving to 
provide a route to reference.  
22 Platts, Ways of Meaning An introduction to a Philosophy of Language, 135.  
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cases such as a well known river ‘Ganga’, there are several objects presented to 
us which signifies this name, we may inclined towards determining whether or 
not the object being presented corresponds exactly to the name used by us or 
in other words the presented object is the bearer of the name. 
Now, there are several ways of determining the same referent from 
different parts of the country in which it spreads-India.  And likewise, several 
descriptions go with it like ‘Is it the river which arises from the one single 
source known as ‘Gangotri’?’ or ‘ . . .  . . . which contains sacred water used in 
purifying human soul’ or ‘ . . .  . . . .one of the greatest river of the country.’  
Hence, so many senses may be attached to the river ‘Ganga’ as there are so 
many ways of determining the referent.   
Frege guessed that the way in which we talk regarding objects is 
through description (Russell holds similar view).  But we may find it clear that 
nothing had been observed in Frege’s theory of description, to support the 
claim that the way of thinking regarding any object must affect the 
understanding of subject regarding any description particularly meant for it.  
Frege uttered very little regarding ways of presentation of an object generally.   
However, Frege tried to attach then to the concept of propositional attitude 
psychology as Gareth Evans holds.  The links between these concepts are 
immediate. 
The sense of a sentence depends upon the sense of its constituent 
parts as Frege held that the only constraint which Frege tries to stipulate what 
Gareth Evans call ‘the intuitive criteria of difference’ which indicates that the 
sense of a sentence, say A, has to be different from the sense of sentence, say, 
B. 
In these two sentences, one can understand both simultaneously 
considering different attitudes towards them.  Taking one as true, while other 
as false.  Frege’s conception of sense need to have its linkage with the 
propositional attitude that may provide solution to the problem-how two 
sentences consisting of same meaning possess different ways of presentation or 
different values of cognition (as in case of Frege’s classical example-‘Morning 
Star’ and ‘Evening Star’). 
Two sentences A& B have got different cognitive values, in case it is 
possible to have understanding of these sentences keeping attitudes differently 
regarding them.  From this, it leads to the point that the conception of a way of 
thinking which is an integrated, inseparable notion of sense has to behave 
somewhat differently from Evans conception of Intuitive criteria of difference 
as in former case the same thought is being dealt at different time while in later 
case we have to deal with the same thought by the same subject in the same 
time.  
From the present discussion, we may conclude that Frege tried to 
present a system of communication through a sentence which consists of a 
proper name.  The competent speaker of language expresses a particular 
sentence ‘p  is A’ bearing the thought in his mind, the content of which 
depends on the sense he ascribe to the singular expression (or proper name) ‘p’ 
and ‘ξ is A.’  The expression of thought has to be concerned with the  
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expression ‘A’ referent which has to be thought in particular way, which in turn 
determines its sense. 
And the hearer of this sentence understands it and the thought 
associated with it, in the same way, i.e., having similar truth value as the 
utterances of the speaker.  In this case, the content of thought of the hearer 
will also have to be determined by the sense he stipulates to the same 
expression. 
On assuming that both speaker and hearer, which are competent 
speakers of the language, are using objective property of expression of 
language and both possess a definite sense  to it, we may claim that the hearer 
will receive the same thought as expressed by the speaker. 
Frege seems to agree on the point that there may be same instances in 
which sentences of a natural language consisting of meaning are successful in 
expressing a thought but still the theory of meaning does not fit here.  Empty 
proper name may contribute in the expression of thought through these 
sentences without consisting of any semantic value from them as per the 
conviction of the theory of meaning. 
Sense seems to be falling short of being a criterion in the 
determination of reference for each person is not going to use the same 
definite description regarding the reference.23 But if all competent speakers of 
language are able to understand that the river ‘Ganga’ as an object being 
presented to us, is actually the bearer of the proper name used by them, the 
conception of determination of reference seems to be quite justified.  The main 
problem arises when a speaker is unaware of the fact that the river is located in 
India and think of its incorrect location, say, USA.  This person may still use 
the name ‘Ganga’ but incorrectly (he will use the name with incorrect sense; 
however he is equipped with a definite criteria in his individual mind).  While, 
if he is said to have understood the word ‘Ganga’ in its correct sense (i.e.  the 
sense ascribed by the competent users of language, generally), he must be in 
good command of using correct method of identifying the referent-river 
named ‘Ganga.’  Dummett was also aware of this difficulty, he holds, “. . . .that 
there is no one condition sufficient for identification . . . .”24 
In this way, we may infer that the notion of sense used by Frege, as a 
part of meaning of a sentence, seems to be subjective and therefore seems to 
be less significant in the theory of meaning which, in principle, should be 
equipped with objectivity in linguistic expressions.  From the present 
discussion we may conclude that the criteria of identification of reference are 
going to vary from person to person in any community of speakers because of 
the inclusion of subjectivity in the notion of sense.  What remain the same 
uniformly in all instances of identification of reference is the reference as an 
objective entity which is the meaning of proper name which names the 
referent.  Dummett asserts that, “. . . the only permanent, objective feature of 
                                                 
23 This is the main point on which Kripke refutes the doctrine of definite descriptions 
used by Frege and Russell too, in his work entitled Naming and Necessity. 
24 Dummett, op cit., 99.  
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the use of a proper name would be its reference, so the only permanent, 
objective feature of the use of a general term would be its application”25 
But it could be argued that meaning is not something subjective, 
otherwise it will go on changing from one speaker to another and so on.   
Meaning must be an objective entity, i.e., subject to empirical investigation.  
Dummett asserts: 
 
Meaning under any theory of whatsoever, cannot be in 
principle subjective, because meaning is a matter of what is 
conveyed by language.  Someone may by mistake or design, 
attach a meaning to some word different from that which 
anyone else attaches to that word: but the meaning must 
be something that could be conveyed to another that the 
person in question was attaching that meaning to the 
word; if not, it would simply not be a meaning at all.26 
 
Frege holds that sense is an ingredient in the intuitive conception of 
meaning, now it seems to have got no truth value in all situations and in all 
available contexts in which a sentence(s) is/are being said and heard in any 
community of speakers, in any fragment of natural language. 
Then what significance sense has got in the theory of meaning? In the 
metaphor used above (‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ ) different senses are reflected by two 
proper names27.The resulting propositions (by using ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ in two 
propositions) will obviously reveal different meaning for the same referent, i.e., 
mountain.  While, in actual this is not the case.  It is in this context that the 
theory of meaning used by the Frege has got significance. 
Now, the scene Frege creates in formulating the theory of meaning 
seems to be far from the application in natural language.  His theory of 
meaning presents highly ideal quality in the use of language which we can’t 
afford or only apply partially in the language we speak.  But the language will 
have to be always directed towards the ideality in language as per the 
conviction of Frege because we encounter several problems in our language 
which can be resolved by applying the theory of meaning, i.e., the theory of 
reference and sense. 
 
Sense Devoid of Meaning: Void Proper Names
28 
 
  Gareth Evans already raised objections to the notion of sense devoid 
of meaning in holding the following: 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 102. 
26 Ibid., 85. 
27 Whenever I use word-proper name, I mean it in the same sense as Frege, singular 
expressions generally. 
28 I will prefer to use the word ‘void proper names’ in place of empty proper names 
(used by Gareth Evans).    
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I have been objecting to Frege’s attempt to discern sense 
where there is no semantic value, essentially on the 
ground that it deprives a theory of semantic value of any 
obvious place in the general theory of language.  It might 
be said that Frege thought of the theory of semantic value 
as needed for the purpose of investigating logical 
inference.  But the theory which Frege offered is adequate 
for this role only if we assume that the language under 
study contains no empty singular terms.  This is a 
restriction for which we could find no justification.29 
 
Frege’s notion of empty proper names reveals that the proper names 
without any semantic value may still have a sense; this point has got extremely 
weak foundation as embracing it would only leads to confusion in 
understanding both sense and semantics of proper names.  Evans further 
asserts: 
 
Names that fail to fulfill the usual role of proper name, 
which is to name something, may be called mock proper 
names.  Although the tale of William Tell is a legend and 
not history, and the name ‘William Tell’ is a mock proper 
name, we cannot deny it a sense.  But the sense of the 
sentence ‘William Tell shot an apple off his son’s head.’  I 
do not say that this sense is false either, but I characterize 
it as fictitious .  .  ..   Instead of speaking about fiction we 
could speak of ‘mock thoughts .  .  ..’30 
 
In the above quote it seems plausibly clear that Frege dared to think of 
sentences which contains what he calls- mock proper names, i.e., proper names 
used in fiction and in this way these sentences have been able to express mock 
thoughts which have nothing to do with reality. 
In such cases, it is mere assumption that we are engaged in expressing 
thoughts by means of sentences containing empty proper names, in fact we are 
deceiving ourselves in doing so for it only lead us to depart from reality and the 
gap between reality and fiction will become much bigger.  And Frege is not to 
be expected to present such doctrine, being a logician.  He said that, “. . . The 
logician does not have to bother with mock thoughts . . . ”31.  Then, why he 
bothers at the first place to deal with such “mock” assertions.   Gareth Evans 
raises another objection in holding that: 
 
However, given that Frege was content to deal with the 
intuitive category of singular terms or referring 
                                                 
29 Evans, op cit., 25. 
30  Frege, Posthumous Writings, 130. 
31 Ibid., 130.  
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expressions, this general model of the functioning of 
singular sentences can not be accepted.  For, although I 
should (and shall) defend the idea that there are many 
kinds of singular term (paradigmatically, genuine 
demonstratives) such that, when they are empty, there can 
be nothing but the illusion of thought expression and of 
understanding, it seems to be impossible to maintain this 
position for all the expressions in the rag bag intuitive 
category.32 
 
If we were to preserve the notion of empty proper names with the 
ascription of sense, then we will have to forget the harmony between semantic 
value and referent of empty proper names.  And the solution to this problem 
as suggested by Evans33 in the form of introduction of an empty set to the 
semantic value of singular term, depending upon its possessing a referent or 
not, is also seems to be misleading as we will find ourselves soon in the mesh 
of confusions as in case of “mock” assertions.  This solution seems to be just 
another side of the same coin, i.e., fiction.  But in some cases like: 
 
(1)  Pluto is the planet of our solar system. 
 
There is nothing like ‘Pluto’ as planet being its referent34.  Now, ‘Pluto’ 
will still possess semantic value viz., empty set but devoid of any referent in 
terms of being a planet.  However, ‘Pluto’ will still remain to exist as a heavenly 
body.As per the conviction of Frege, the sense of this empty proper name 
would be a particular way of presentation of its semantic value, i.e., no object is 
being presented as its referent.  This semantic value is different from the 
semantic value in which it used to be a planet. 
 
Theory of Reference Concerning Proper Names 
 
Wang Lu had already pointed out that, “. . . the theory of meaning 
should inherit Frege’s results of reference and take them as the basis of 
discussion and development” (already quoted above).  Hence, the theory of 
reference is at the core of Frege’s theory of meaning.  Reference of an 
expression serves in the determination of truth value of a sentence occurring in 
a part of natural language, as it seems to be the only criteria of determining 
truth value of an expression.  It is useful to quote Dummett from above that, “. 
. . the only permanent, objective feature of the use of a proper name would be 
                                                 
32 Evans, op cit., 31. 
33 Ibid., 32. 
34 International Astronomical Union, on its meeting at Prague (Czech Republic) on 
August 24th 2006, decided that ‘Pluto’ will no more included in the category of planets.  They did 
so, on the basis of new definition of a planet (decided by them).  
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its reference, so the only permanent, objective feature of the use of a general 
term would be its application”35 
As we have already observed that an expression without any reference 
may still display the sense reflected by an empty proper name, occurring in a 
sentence which expresses a thought.  Dummett uttered that: 
 
But, once the reference of each word in a sentence has 
been determined, the truth- value of the sentence is 
thereby determined.  It was just because of this that we 
were able to assign, on-effectively but determinatively, a 
truth- value to each sentence in the language of predicate 
logic, relative to some interpretation which fixed the 
references of the non-logical constants: and in any case 
Frege himself is explicit, and insistent, that the 
replacement in any sentence of some word or expression 
by another having the same reference leaves the truth–
value of the whole unchanged.  It thus appears that the 
sense of an expression must coincide with its reference, 
or, at least, that there must be a one-one correspondence 
between senses and references.  Yet, notoriously, Frege 
held that many senses could correspond to the same 
reference.  How, then, could he find room for such a 
notion of sense at all?36 
 
Further he proceeds in holding that:  
 
The solution to the dilemma has already been stated: 
reference is not an ingredient in meaning.  If reference 
were an ingredient in meaning, then indeed the reference 
of a word would exhaust-or determine-its sense, since 
nothing more would need to be known about its meaning 
in order to fix the truth-value of any sentence in which it 
occurred.  ‘ . . .  . . . .  But I think that if we seek to 
understand the claim that reference is not an ingredient in 
meaning, it will be seen to accord well with Frege’s way of 
looking at the matter, although not with his way of 
expressing it.’37 
 
Reference may be known only when one fully understands the 
meaning provided by it, which is reflected by others ingredients of meaning 
like sense, tone.  Mere presence of reference of any proper name which is 
obviously its meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient condition of 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 102. 
36 Dummett, op cit., 91. 
37 Ibid., 91-92.  
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understanding a particular reference.  There are others factors such as sense, 
which helps in the determination of reference of a singular expression. 
Hence, it has not to be misunderstood that reference is not an 
ingredient in meaning, as without reference there would be no such thing as 
meaning.  Reference is essentially provides the substratum on which the theory 
of meaning rests.  But to understand the reference, there must be, as Dummett 
claims, some way of determining it.  As per the conviction of Frege, the way is 
known as ‘sense.’   Dummett described the idea in asserting that: 
 
‘The sense of a word thus consists in some means by 
which a reference of an appropriate kind is determined 
for that word.  To say that reference is not an ingredient 
in meaning is not to deny that reference is a consequence 
of meaning, or that the notion of reference has a vital role 
to play in the general theory of meaning: it is only to say 
that the understanding which a speaker of a language has 
a word in that language . . . can never consist merely in 
his associating a certain thing with it as its referent; there 
must be some particular means by which this association 
is affected, the knowledge of which constitutes his grasp 
of its sense.’38 
 
Frege thinks that a speaker of any natural language who knows the 
referent of certain expression expects the hearer to understand the sense of 
that expression.  But the hearer doesn’t necessarily possess understanding 
about the referent, for there may be several singular expressions which are 
devoid of any reference.   
The sense of an expression present in sentence of any part of natural 
language should correspond to some referent which essentially deals with 
providing some meaning to that expression.  It is not plausible to think that 
how can there be any sense without having any object, i.e., referent to be 
sensed about? 
Frege asserts that in case of such singular terms it is necessary to 
understand its sense but to understand its referent is not necessary.  Elsewhere 
he took example of expressions possessing sense but devoid of any reference 
e.g.  ‘the celestial body most distant from the earth.’  Now, it has a sense, but 
its existence is doubtful, i.e., it may not have any referent. 
Likewise, can the expression ‘a round square’ have any sense, which is 
mathematically impossible? In one place Dummett says: “An expression can 
have sense but lack any reference.  This is one of Frege’s best known doctrines, 
and it is one of the hardest to hold in position in his philosophical system 
taken as a whole.”39 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 84. 
39 Ibid., 160.  
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Here, Frege’s philosophy of language seems to be shattered, 
considering the lacunae in his theory of meaning, i.e., sense without reference.  
He also considers the case of singular expressions, i.e., proper names without 
reference-empty proper names (as discussed above).  In such cases he says that 
sentences containing them are devoid of any truth values. 
To Frege, if someone accepts a sentence containing empty proper 
names, then he is forming a belief about the world and not about the language 
itself.  Gareth Evans says that, “. . . But what sense can be made of a belief 
which literally has no truth value- which is neither correct nor incorrect? It is 
precisely this incomprehension, so effectively voiced by Dummett that makes 
Frege’s choice of truth values as the semantic values of sentences so 
opposite”40. 
Now, it is worthwhile to raise one more significant question- is there 
any possibility of reference without sense? Let us consider the example of 
‘Pluto.’  Recently, it had been discovered that planet ‘Pluto’ will be no more in 
the category of planet in our solar system, being devoid of characteristic of 
planet.  It used to be a planet in our solar system.  What sense these singular 
expressions possess? What will be its mode of presentation as Frege held? The 
speaker of the language, who is not aware of this fact, will continue to add 
sense to it.  But there seems to be no meaning being revealed by the term 
‘Pluto’ in terms of being a planet.  However, reference is there as just a 
heavenly body present in the outskirts of the orbit of our solar system. 
Donald Davidson prescribes that the theory of meaning, as a whole 
may be comprehended by two methods, i.e., the building–block method 
(building complex sentences from simpler ones) and the holistic method (starts 
with complex sentences and then deal with its fragment parts).  The first 
method seems to be fall short of being applied, practically.  Second one may be 
dealt with the application of behavioral aspects of speakers with the sentences 
occurring in language.  In doing so, fragments of sentences may be 
encountered with, but semantic value of sentences may not be preserved.41 
Davidson depicts that, “. . . With the building block approach goes the causal 
theory of proper names, which Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan, 
among others, have done so much to make plausible”42.   
The causal theory of proper names is basically the causal theory of reference 
according to which a proper name is introduced by some introducer(s) in some 
using application of proper name of a certain speech community (baptism).  
Then the baptized name is stipulated of its reference and this is how a name 
acquires its referent and stipulated.  Davidson interpretation of this theory runs 
in holding that a name is baptized with a reference subject to its empirical 
investigation43.  The other method follows that interpretation of sentences 
depends on the various using application of proper names applied by various 
                                                 
40 Evans, op cit., 24. 
41 John McDowell, “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,” 136. 
42 Ibid., 136. 
43 Davidson uses this word.  
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users on our natural language.  Davidson refutes this approach by suggesting 
that the concept of reference may be dropped as the holistic approach 
demands empirical investigation, according to him reference falls short of 
accessing content of the relation between a proper name and its corresponding 
object.  Davidson provides another reason in eradicating the need of reference 
form the theory of meaning in holding that the problem of reference may be 
resolved by encountering the distinction between explanation within the theory 
and explanation of the theory44.  By using the word within the theory, he means 
that the concepts contributing in syntactic and semantic values while by using 
of the theory he is concerned about dealing with truth as a whole or dealing 
with the truth conditions of the sentences. 
But reference dropping from the theory of meaning seems to be quite 
unjustified as in fact there are not two methods of dealing with the theory of 
meaning but there is only one, i.e., simultaneous approach of syntactic and 
semantic treatment of the sentences occurring in a part of language as did by 
Frege and the output of the theory of meaning is obviously directed towards 
truth conditions of the sentences.  Davidson asserts that “The theory gives up 
reference, then, as part of the cost of going empirical”45.Now, empirical 
investigation is itself based on the reference.  Davidson thinks that the 
dropping reference does not mean that the semantics had also been dropped.  
But practically dropping reference would also drop the semantics of the 
sentences.  If he would insist that, in doing so, semantics of the sentences 
would be preserved, then reference would include itself, however it’s name may 
be changed in the form of description like ‘empirical investigation of the theory of 
meaning which reveals the truth conditions of the sentences.’   Hence, 
Davidson claim of dropping reference is not well directed, it is only reference 
which determines the semantic value of the sentences. 
 Conclusively, it may be said that the theory of reference is also one of 
the most striking and fundamental feature of the theory of meaning which 
can’t be dropped from it and which rests on the notion of proper names and 
provides semantic value to the sentences.  The notion of sense serves the 
function of providing a way to determine the reference. 
 
The Theory of Speech Acts: An Evolutionary Approach over 
Frege’s Theory of Meaning 
 
The Approach of Austin 
 
After going through Frege’s theory of meaning, it seems extremely 
useful to consider the theory of speech acts, as put forward by J.L Austin and 
John Searle because the theory presents a better picture on the issue of 
meaning.  The theory also tries to demonstrate language as social conventional 
practice.  First, I would like to consider the approach of J.L.  Austin. 
                                                 
44 McDowell, “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,” 137. 
45 Ibid., 138.    
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Austin claims that there are some utterances which promote actual 
actions or performances.  These utterances may be called as performative 
utterances.  Speech acts are basically those conventional acts which are 
determined by customs, traditions and belief system of human society.  The 
acts include “I study”, “I appreciate”, “I marry” etc. 
These performative utterances have something to do with actually 
doing something and are contrary to making statements.  According to Austin, 
statements are being made primarily to pass performative acts like making a 
request, giving orders, asking for apology etc.  These speech acts are 
determined by a unique feature of utterances which he calls as illocutionary force.  
The type of speech acts is determined by virtue of these illocutionary forces.    
However, if any act has not been performed in actual (due to lack of 
intentions on the part of doer) then the performative utterance may turn out to 
be what Austin calls hollow or void46.  For example, if I promise to perform a 
certain act without involving any intention to do so then the utterance “I 
promise” becomes void.  The speech act in this case becomes what Austin calls 
infelicitous.  Frege’s notion of mock assertions may also promote void 
performative utterances.  These may be the cases of fiction (Frege), acting in a 
movie (Austin) etc.  Austin holds that such uses of language are not serious and 
are parasitic on general use of language47 
Contrary to philosophers of language like Frege, Davidson; he looks 
on hearer’s side (i.e.  his psychological state) in the process of communication.  
Austin calls such feature of utterances as perlocution.  Frege and Davidson stress 
too much on truth conditions of sentences but there are other dimensions of 
utterances that make them infect (without making them false) or infelicitous.   
Frege’s theory of meaning puts emphasis on the meaning of sentences 
in terms of its propositional content.  Austin’s approach preserves this 
propositional content of the theory along with suggesting some unique features 
of utterances like illocutionary force, perlocution.  By inventing the notion of speech 
acts, he dared to go beyond truth conditional approach so that the process of 
communication may be better explained. 
 
The Approach of Searle 
 
Frege tries to maintain objective aspect in communication.  John 
Searle holds that there are several other dimensions (beyond objective one) 
which must be taken in to account.  The process of communication is not as 
simple as it seems to be.  There lies huge difference between what a speaker 
mean and what the hearer understands.  This is what Paul Grice describes as 
speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning. 
                                                 
46 Austin uses this word in the context of speech acts.  I have used the word in the 
context of proper names which refer nothing in actual (1.2.1). 
47 See also J.L. Austin, How to do things with words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 22.   
48 See also John Searle, Expression and Meaning (Studies in the theory of Speech acts) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30-32.     
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Searle claims that sometimes speaker wishes to express more than his 
utterance.  These are the cases of, what he calls, indirect speech acts.  Such acts are 
performed on the basis of speaker’s and hearer’s common theoretical 
background including linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, contexts (in 
which utterances are being made), inferential aspects on hearer’s side etc.  For 
example, a speaker may express the sentence “May I ask your name?” .Now he 
is not getting permission to know the name of the person but wishes to 
actually know the name.48 The speaker intends to produce information to the 
hearer that a request has been made to know his name.  Sometimes a speaker 
utters a sentence and means something else as in using metaphors. 
Searle makes distinction between primary illocutionary act (which is 
the main intention of the speaker and not spoken literally) and secondary 
illocutionary act (which is literally uttered).  According to Searle, primary 
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by mean of secondary illocutionary 
act49.  For example, a man utters to his servant “Will you keep quiet?”  .He 
actually orders to his servant to be quiet (primary illocutionary act) by putting 
the question (secondary illocutionary act).  Hence, speaker’s intention is going 
beyond his utterance. 
But in virtue of what a speaker intends to perform one speech act by 
mean of another speech act? Searle did not bother to provide a detailed 
account of this problem.  It seems merely a commonsense social conventional 
practice of language. 
In Frege’s theory of meaning, the theory of sense and the theory of 
reference may be explained in terms of the theory of speech acts.  Frege 
describes sense as a mode of presentation.  Proper names ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ 
display different senses (1.2). 
Talking in terms of Searle’s speech act theory, ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ 
consist of same primary aspect (obviously when the speaker is aware that both 
names refer to the same mountain) but secondary aspect is different.  Two 
propositions (in which ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ occurs) refer to secondary 
illocutionary act.  The speaker, who utters these propositions, is actually 
intends to produce information that both propositions are meant for same 
mountain, i.e., consist of similar truth value.  This is the primary illocutionary 
act which the speaker wishes to express. 
I think that Searle offers better solution to the problem of identity 
terms.  In case of using ‘Aphla’, the speaker is simply picking out one aspect 
under which the object is referred, i.e., mountain.  The speaker actually wishes 
to refer (under primary aspect) “the mountain over there which is over 5000 
meters high.”  He intends to pass this information to the hearer so that he may 
identify his prime intention to generate this utterance.  The same may be true 
of using ‘Ateb.’  Usage of both proper names (‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’) suggests that 
two different aspects have been pick out so that the right object may be 
                                                 
48 See also John Searle, Expression and Meaning (Studies in the theory of Speech acts) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30-32.    
  
49 Ibid., 143.  
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referred, but the primary aspect lies (on the part of speaker and the hearer) in 
the utterance “the mountain over there which is over 5000 meters high.” 
There may be still another aspect (which may be called as tertiary) 
which suggests that both the names ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ refer to the same 
referent, i.e., mountain. 
Reference stipulation and determination is at the core of Frege’s 
theory of meaning.  According to Searle’s speech act theory, the reference may 
be determined by the specification of that aspect under which reference is 
being made.  This is what Searle calls primary aspect.    
 
Conclusion 
 
Frege’s treatment of the notion of sense and reference had been 
fundamentally applied to proper name which suggests the following: 
1)  Frege tries to present before us, a model in which referring expression may 
be fitted for direct application to a formalized language like arithmetic.  
Naturally the same we can’t do with the natural language, as the latter 
possess the characteristic of equipped with context dependence, which is 
why it seems impossible, the application of the model presented by Frege 
to natural language.50  
2)  It seems a matter of great surprise that out of the theory of sense and the 
theory of reference we have arrived to a conclusion that we have 
discovered a definite way which may be applied for every proper name and 
its bearer present in our natural language.  John McDowell already 
observes the point “There is, however, not the slightest reason to expect 
that one could construct, out of such material, a general relational formula 
true of every name and its bearer.”51  Saul Kripke made a careful treatment 
of such theory of sense by defending it in the light of propounding a causal 
theory of reference.52  
3)  If we are to embrace the causal theory of reference, then we will have to refute 
the descriptivist’s approach (of Frege and Russell) regarding the behavior 
of proper names.53    
4)  As far as dealing with the atomic sentences is concerned, i.e., in that the 
object of our perception is followed by some proper name earlier being its 
meaning,54 Frege’s model seems to be quite safe and justified.  But dealing 
with mock thoughts being expressed by some mock assertions contain 
                                                 
50  David Kaplan, Demonstratives (Unpublished work). 
51 John McDowell, “On the sense and reference of a proper name,” 162. 
52 See also ‘Naming and Necessity.’  I have provided a detailed account of Kripke’s 
conception of causal theory of reference in the next chapter in which Kripke’s refutation against 
Frege and Russell seems to be well directed, but the theory in itself leaves some lacuna which I 
described in the same chapter.    
53 This point may be described as the central theme of present dissertation.   
Proceeding chapters are devoted to critically analyze the Kripke’s refutation of descriptivist’s 
approach (of Frege and Russell).   
54 Platts, op cit., 133-138.  
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mock proper name.  Frege is quite justifiable and this conception seems to 
be quite illogical, for we possess very tiny knowledge of the extremely 
complex  psyche of human minds, i.e., how human thought run with 
particular object.  And a particular subject about a particular object in such 
a strange way that it reflects the non existence of that object, then even a 
thought wouldn’t have been expressed.  Hence, Frege’s model of referring 
expressions falls short to be applied in natural language. 
5)  According to Evan’s intuitive criteria of difference, when one ascribe a 
name to a particular object, he attaches competency to the object so 
named and thoughts thus expressed is qualified by the intuitive criteria 
while at the same time different subjects thinking of same object but 
different thoughts have been expressed by the same sentences containing 
that name. 
6)  The theory of reference has got its foundation on the notion of proper 
names which in turn directly affects the theory of sense.   
7)  The theory of reference is inseparably connected with the theory of 
meaning which leads to determiner the truth value of sentences by 
reflecting their semantics which in turn linguistically preserved by the 
notion of reference.  And as a result, ontologically there is an immediate 
display of an object corresponding to the utterance of a proper name by 
some speaker of language.  Hence, Davidson suggestions to drop the reference 
from the theory of meaning may not be accepted. 
8)  Both the theories, i.e., the theory of sense and the theory of reference 
concerning proper names are nothing but an ingredient in the theory of 
meaning prescribed by Frege. 
9)  Both Dummett and Evans agree that the Frege’s model of communication 
is the Ideal one55 (for it refers to the claim that we hardly understand one 
another perfectly).  But still, the conception of Proper names serve some 
purpose of effective communication as linking with the object under 
consideration.  And Frege’s model of communication of reference still 
possesses weight age in its application. 
10) To conclude the matter it is worth while to quote Dummett: 
 
 . . . the practice of speaking a language and the theory of 
meaning which gives an account of that practice can thus 
not be separated, except in thought: they constantly 
interact with one other.  The notion of sense, therefore, 
not a mere theoretical tool to be used in giving an 
account of a language; it is one which , in an inchoate 
fashion, we constantly appeal to or make use of in our 
actual practice( as , for instance, when we challenge some 
one to make precise the sense in which he is using some  
expression).56 
                                                 
55 Dummett , op cit., 105-06. 
56 Ibid., 107.  
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Hence, we can not draw a sharp distinction between the use of natural 
language and the construction of theories regarding its working.  Dummett 
calls natural language as ‘meta-language’ (in which there is an expression of the 
theories regarding its working) and object language (a formalized language for 
which the theories of meaning/semantics are being constructed). 
 
11) We, as a speaker of some natural language may apply the prescription of 
these theories to a part our language but not according a formalized 
pattern but a pattern of our own which leads to the understanding of 
meaning of sentences we speak.  For example, when emphasis is being 
made to express the sense in which a competent speaker is expressing a 
thought so that we may understand, as a listener, the same sense of 
expressed thought put forward by the sentence(s) used for given purpose. 
12) The theory of speech acts presents an evolutionary approach over Frege’s 
theory of meaning.  Along with preserving truth conditional approach of 
Frege (what Austin calls locution), Austin suggests some distinctive features 
of utterances (involved in the process of communication) like illocutionary 
force, perlocution.  For the first time in the history of philosophy of language, 
Austin dared to move beyond literal meaning of utterances by inventing 
the notion of speech acts. 
13) Searle’s speech act theory presents an improved picture of sense and 
reference by inventing the concept of primary and secondary aspect of the 
utterances involved in communication.  The approach also presents an 
evolutionary picture over Frege’s theory of meaning in a more 
comprehensive and plausible manner.   
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